Defence Scheme No. 1

Origins and Strategic Context

The genesis of Defence Scheme No. 1 lies in the shifting geopolitical landscape following the First World War. Although the United States had fought alongside Britain and Canada from 1917, the American return to isolationism reintroduced historical tensions. As a loyal dominion of the British Empire, Canada was compelled to consider the possibility of a conflict between its imperial mother country and its powerful southern neighbour. Lieutenant Colonel James Sutherland Brown, known as "Buster," was tasked by the Canadian military with developing a contingency plan for this worst-case scenario. His creation, Defence Scheme No. 1, was formally approved on April 12, 1921. The plan operated on the core assumption that the United States would initiate hostilities by invading key Canadian population centres like Montreal, Ottawa, Hamilton, Toronto, the Prairie Provinces, and Vancouver and Southwestern British Columbia. The plan was developed without coordination with British military authorities, who had privately concluded they could not defend Canada against the United States.

The Invasion Plan: Objectives and Tactics

Defence Scheme No. 1 was not a blueprint for conquest but rather a large-scale delaying action. Its central premise was to launch a surprise, multi-pronged invasion of the northern United States immediately upon receiving evidence of an impending American attack. The objective was to seize the initiative, disrupt US mobilization, and create a buffer zone to allow Canada time to prepare its defences and await British aid. The plan called for coordinated attacks from three main Canadian military commands, each with specific geographic objectives. Forces were to advance using the concept of flying columns, which were intended to be fast-moving, independent units. The plan acknowledged that these advances could not be held indefinitely against the larger US military. As American resistance solidified, Canadian forces were to conduct a fighting retreat back to the border, destroying bridges, railways, and other infrastructure along the way to slow the inevitable US pursuit.

• Pacific Command: Responsible for seizing Seattle, Spokane, and Portland with flying columns.
• Prairie Command: Tasked with attacking Fargo and Great Falls, then advancing towards Minneapolis.
• Quebec Forces: Assigned a surprise counterattack to capture Albany, New York.
• Maritime Provinces: Ordered to invade and occupy the state of Maine.

The planned retreat involved systematic destruction of transportation links to hinder the American advance into Canada. This scorched-earth tactic was meant to compound the delay achieved by the initial invasion. The purpose was to allow time for Canada to prepare its war effort and to receive aid from Britain, not to achieve any lasting territorial gain. The plan detailed that troops would retreat to their own borders, destroying bridges and railways to delay US military pursuit.

On-the-Ground Reconnaissance and Intelligence

From 1921 to 1926, Lieutenant Colonel Brown and other officers conducted clandestine reconnaissance missions along the US border to gather intelligence for the scheme. Travelling in plainclothes to avoid detection, they surveyed potential invasion routes, transportation networks, and the general lay of the land. Historian Pierre Berton later described these missions as having "a zany flavour," an assessment supported by Brown's own informal and often colourful field reports. Brown recorded observations on the temperament and preparedness of the local populace, noting in Burlington, Vermont, that the people were "affable" and thus unusual for Americans. He commented that Americans drank significantly less alcohol than Canadians, a fact attributable to Prohibition, and relayed an anecdote where an American exclaimed he would go to "Canady" to get some beer. Brown's personal notes, which blended casual observation with strategic guesswork, formed a unique intelligence base for the war plan. He speculated that many people in the US might be sympathetic with the British cause.

• Location: Reconnaissance focused on border areas, notably Vermont.
• Method: Officers operated in plainclothes from 1921 to 1926.
• Observation on Temperament: Brown noted Vermonters were "fat and lazy but pleasant and congenial."
• Observation on Readiness: He believed they would be serious soldiers only "if aroused."
• Cultural Note: He speculated many Americans had a "sneaking regard" for British law and civilization.
• Logistical Focus: Missions scoped out bridges, locks, and railroad lines for future sabotage or use.
• Historical Context: These reconnaissance trips are detailed in Berton's book Marching As to War (2002).

Critical Reception and Strategic Flaws

Defence Scheme No. 1 has been met with criticism by historians and military analysts since its details emerged. The plan suffered from several fatal strategic flaws that made its successful execution highly improbable. A primary criticism, levelled by historian Christopher M. Bell, is that the scheme was essentially suicidal. Brown had developed the plan without coordination with British military authorities, who had privately concluded they could not defend Canada against the United States and had no intention of sending a large expeditionary force. Therefore, the sacrifice of Canada's best troops in a pre-emptive strike would have been for no tangible strategic gain. Bell argued that a purely defensive strategy, as the Americans themselves expected, would have been Canada's only viable option. The plan misunderstood key strategic priorities, notably failing to emphasize the critical importance of keeping Atlantic ports like Halifax, Nova Scotia, open for British reinforcement. Despite these flaws, the plan had contemporary supporters such as General George Pearkes, who later remarked it was a "fantastic desperate plan [which] just might have worked." Most modern analysis aligns with the view of a retired Canadian major and historian who described such defence schemes as "make-work projects" and "expressions of intent" that "border on folly." Bell also noted that Brown did not understand the importance of keeping Halifax, a main target of a US invasion, open.

Forces, Equipment, and Practical Challenges

The practical implementation of Defence Scheme No. 1 would have faced immense logistical and personnel challenges. The troops for the flying columns and invasions would most likely have been drawn from the volunteer militia, as Canada's small permanent force was insufficient for such an ambitious operation. A retired Canadian major and military historian noted that persuading citizen-soldiers to volunteer for such a mission would have been difficult. The forces envisioned were not professional soldiers but militiamen, leading the same historian to quip that at best, the flying columns would have made Pancho Villa's forces "look like icy professionals." In terms of equipment, the plan existed in an interstitial period between cavalry and mechanized warfare. The flying columns would likely have been deployed in unarmoured Ford trucks rather than on horses or in tanks. These trucks would have been packed with soldiers, explosives, Lee-Enfield rifles, and Lewis machine guns. The ad-hoc nature of the force and its equipment showed the vast disparity in military potential between Canada and the United States at the time. The plan is analyzed in scholarly works such as Canadian Brass: The Making of a Professional Army, 1860 to 1939 by Steven Harris, which includes a section on interwar defence planning.

Termination and Relationship to War Plan Red

Defence Scheme No. 1 was formally terminated in 1928 by Chief of the General Staff Andrew McNaughton, who sought to foster peaceful relations between the British Empire and the United States. Upon the plan's cancellation, McNaughton ordered the destruction of most related documents, leaving only fragments for historians to study. The scheme's existence is often discussed in tandem with its American counterpart, War Plan Red. Developed by the United States War Department in 1930 and later refined, War Plan Red outlined a full-scale invasion of Canada in the event of war with the British Empire. Its opening moves included proposals to use poison gas to capture Halifax, demonstrating the serious planning on both sides of the border. The near-simultaneous development of these two invasion plans shows the latent suspicions and military preparedness that characterized the relationship between the two neighbours during the interwar period. The scenario of North America becoming a battlefield receded only with the solidification of the Anglo-American alliance during the Second World War.

Historical Significance and Legacy in Canadian Memory

Today, Defence Scheme No. 1 is remembered as a historical footnote that reveals the complexities of Canada's position in the early 20th century. It illustrates the challenging duality of Canadian defence policy, caught between loyalty to the British Empire and geographical and economic reality alongside the United States. The plan highlights the resource constraints and strategic anxieties of a small Canadian military staff attempting to plan for a catastrophic war it could not hope to win alone. Its legacy is one of historical irony, a time when Canadian officers plotted invasions of American cities like Seattle and Minneapolis. The scheme is a product of the diligent work of military planners preparing for every conceivable contingency. It is featured in historical analyses and continues to capture public interest through media and academic works.

• Historical Analysis: Featured in Pierre Berton's book Marching As to War (2002).
• Modern Commentary: Discussed in Kevin Lippert's recent book War Plan Red.
• Public Fascination: Maps and details of the plan are shared in modern articles and on social media.
• Academic Study: Analyzed in works like The Defence of the Undefended Border by Richard A. Preston (1977).
• Military History: Reviewed in publications such as the Canadian Army Journal (Vol. 8.1, 2005).
• Media Coverage: Subject of a major feature in The Washington Post on December 30, 2005.
• Related Plans: Part of a series of Canadian defence schemes, including Defence Scheme No. 2.
• External Resources: An excerpt from the plan is available online, and a PDF review was archived in 2011.

Questions about Defence Scheme No. 1

What was the main goal of Defence Scheme No. 1?

The primary goal was to delay an expected American invasion of Canada. By launching a surprise, multi-pronged attack into northern US border states, Canadian planners hoped to disrupt US mobilization and create a buffer zone. This delaying action was intended to buy time for Canada to prepare its own war effort and for the British Empire to send military reinforcements. The plan explicitly called for a retreat back to Canadian borders once resistance grew, destroying infrastructure to slow the US advance.

Who created Defence Scheme No. 1 and when?

Defence Scheme No. 1 was created by Lieutenant Colonel James "Buster" Sutherland Brown, the Canadian Director of Military Operations and Intelligence. The plan was formally drafted and approved on April 12, 1921. Brown was the principal author and architect of the scheme, and he personally conducted much of the reconnaissance for it along the US border between 1921 and 1926.

Which American cities were targeted in the plan?

The plan targeted several major cities and regions in the northern United States for seizure. Key objectives included Seattle, Spokane, and Portland in the Pacific Northwest. In the northern plains, troops were to take Fargo and Great Falls before advancing on Minneapolis. In the east, the plan called for a surprise attack to capture Albany, New York, and a full-scale invasion and occupation of the state of Maine.

Why was Defence Scheme No. 1 cancelled?

The plan was terminated in 1928 by Chief of the General Staff Andrew McNaughton. McNaughton believed in fostering peaceful relations between the British Empire and the United States and saw the aggressive contingency plan as contrary to that goal. The plan's strategic assumptions were flawed. Upon cancellation, McNaughton ordered the destruction of most documents related to the scheme.

Was there an American plan to invade Canada?

Yes, the United States developed its own contingency plan for a war with the British Empire, which included the invasion of Canada. Known as War Plan Red, it was created by the US War Department in 1930. War Plan Red involved a large-scale invasion of Canada, with initial operations including proposals to use poison gas to capture the critical port of Halifax, Nova Scotia. This plan was the American counterpart to Canada's Defence Scheme No. 1, and both were developed during a period of hypothetical planning for a conflict between the United States and the British Empire.

How is Defence Scheme No. 1 viewed by historians?

Historians generally view Defence Scheme No. 1 as a quixotic and fundamentally flawed plan. While some contemporary military figures like General George Pearkes thought it might have worked, most analysts, such as historian Christopher M. Bell, criticize it as suicidal and based on a misunderstanding of British support. It is often seen as a "make-work project" for staff officers.

Sources and further reading

• Defence Scheme No. 1 (Wikipedia)
• What if Canada had acted on its 1921 Defense Scheme No ... (minnpost.com)
• Defence Scheme No. 1 - by Dan Gardner (dgardner.substack.com)

Checked by the Nosy Mag desk. Last updated 2026-10-29.